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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1980, "liability by association" has been a basic precept of
environmental law.' The mere association with property where a sub-
stance is found, or an association with the substance, can give rise to
financially devastating environmental liabilities.2 The required "asso-
ciation" with the site can arise through the ownership of an interest in
t Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law.
1. See generally David E. Pierce, The Emerging Role of "Liability-Forcing" in Environ-
mental Protection, 30 WAsHmtuRN L. 381, 382-83 (1991) [hereinafter Liability-Forcing].
2. Relatively "small" environmental cleanups can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars;
larger problems can cost tens of millions of dollars. E.g., Quaker State Corp. v. U.S. Coast
Guard, 681 F. Supp. 280, 283, 285 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (requiring surface owner to reimburse Coast
Guard $430,000 for cleanup of oil containment pit); United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460,
1462 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (cleanup cost estimates ranging from $54 million to $150 million), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 982 F.2d 1436, 1448 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Advance Chem.
Co. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993).
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contaminated property3 or the operation of contaminated property.4
Association with the substance can arise by generating the substance,5
transporting it to the site,6 or arranging for its disposal in some fash-
ion.7 Persons deemed to have "contributed" to a contamination prob-
lem can also be forced to clean it up.8
Liability is based upon the "status" of the party, not their "fault."
Therefore, if a third party, such as an oil and gas lessee, contaminates
land in the course of its operations, the "owner" of the land9 can be
liable for the cleanup. The landowner's liability arises not from their
3. E.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1994) (making the current "owner" of a facility where
a hazardous substance is found responsible for cleanup); CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(2) (1994) (making the owner of a facility "at the time of disposal" responsible for
cleanup).
4. CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1994) (making the current "operator" of
a facility where a hazardous substance is found responsible for cleanup); CERCLA § 107(a)(2),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994) (making the operator of a facility "at the time of disposal" respon-
sible for cleanup).
5. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1994) (imposing cleanup liability on any
person that arranges for disposal of hazardous substances "owned or possessed by such
person").
6. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994) (imposing cleanup liability on any
person that transports hazardous substances and selects the disposal site).
7. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1994) (imposing cleanup liability on any
person that arranges for disposal of hazardous substances owned or possessed "by any other
party").
8. Solid Waste Disposal (Resource Conservation and Recovery) Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a) (1994) (citizen suits), provides, in part:
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
[A]gainst any person... and including any past or present generator, past or
present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or
disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present han-
dling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment;
The district court shall have jurisdiction... to order such person to take such.., action
as may be necessary ....
The Environmental Protection Agency is given similar authority in § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a)
(1994), which provides, in part:
[Ulpon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator
may bring suit... against any person (including any past or present generator, past or
present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or
disposal facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to such handling, storage,
treatment, transportation or disposal to restrain such person from such handling, stor-
age, treatment, transportation, or disposal, to order such person to take such other
action as may be necessary, or both.
9. Who could be the owner of only the surface estate.
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culpability or causation, but rather their status as the owner of an in-
terest in the contaminated property.10 This creates an entirely new
category of concerns for property owners who convey mineral inter-
ests in their property while retaining a surface interest. These con-
cerns are equally compelling for a landowner who enters into an oil
and gas lease. This article examines the property," contract, and stat-
utory dimensions of how a landowner/lessor's environmental risk can
impact the rights and obligations of the oil and gas developer.' 2
II. THE PROPERTY DIMENSION
A. Ownership
Whenever more than one "owner" has the right to use property,
the activities of any one interest owner may increase the environmen-
tal risks of all interest owners. The "owner" status concept used by
environmental laws does not require a fee simple absolute in the prop-
erty.' 3 Although an "owner" need not possess the entire bundle of
sticks, the problem is defining what stick, or combination of sticks, will
suffice.
One approach to defining "owner" focuses on the "authority to
control" created by the property interest. For example, in Nurad, Inc.
v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 4 the fee owner of the property was
attempting to recover cleanup costs from tenants who had leased
buildings on the property.'5 Underground storage tanks on the prop-
erty had leaked mineral spirits and Nurad, Inc., as the current
10. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1106 (1989) ("The traditional elements of tort culpability on which the site-owners rely simply
are absent from the statute [CERCLA]."); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044
(2d Cir. 1985) ("[CERCLA] section 9607(a)(1) unequivocally imposes strict liability on the cur-
rent owner of a facility from which there is a release or threat of release, without regard to
causation.").
11. The "property" dimension also encompasses a tort dimension since exceeding the prop-
erty rights granted will result in a trespass.
12. For an extensive discussion of how oil and gas relationships can be structured prospec-
tively to avoid or manage environmental risk, see David E. Pierce, Structuring Routine Oil and
Gas Transactions to Minimize Environmental Liability, 33 WASHBTURN L.J. 76 (1993) [hereinafter
Structuring].
13. CERCLA, for example, defines "owner" as "any person owning" the facility. CER-
CLA § 101(20)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) (1994). This non-definition has caused courts
to find that Congress intended the word to be given its ordinary meaning instead of a technical
meaning. E.g., Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir.
1988). But cf. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Calif. Living Trust, 32 F.3d
1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that its intent was to adopt "common law definitions" of the
term, although purporting to adopt the "ordinary meaning" approach stated in Edward Hines).
14. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
15. Id. at 840.
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"owner" of the property, was ordered by state environmental officials
to remove the tanks and remediate the contaminated area.16 In evalu-
ating the potential liability of the tenants as "owners," the court ap-
plied the same analysis it used to determine whether the tenants were
"operators. 17 The court articulated its "authority to control" test as
follows:
The district court applied the correct standard in holding that the
tenant defendants need not have exercised actual control in order to
qualify as operators under § 9607(a)(2) [of CERCLA], so long as
the authority to control the facility was present .... [T]he district
court's examination of the terms of the various leases in question
indicated that it recognized that authority to control-not actual
control-was the appropriate standard. This is the definition of the
word "operator" that most courts have adopted, and it is one which
properly declines to absolve from CERCLA liability a party who
possessed the authority to abate the damage caused by the disposal
of hazardous substances but who declined to actually exercise that
authority by undertaking efforts at a cleanup.' 8
The Nurad court's rationale for using an "authority to control"
test was to place cleanup obligations on those who had the ability,
because of their property interest,19 to address the problem either at
the time it was created or when it was discovered.20 The court in
Nurad held that the tenants were not liable as "owners" 2' because
under the terms of their leases they lacked any rights in the tanks or
the area impacted by contamination from the tanks.22 Notably, the
court carefully reviewed the underlying leases to ascertain the nature
16. Id. The tanks had been installed by William E. Hooper & Sons Co. prior to 1935 and
used through 1962. Id. The property was sold in 1963 to Property Investors, Inc. which later
leased several buildings on the property to various tenants. Id. Monumental Enterprises, Inc.,
as the successor to Property Investors, sold the property to Kenneth Mumaw in 1976. Id.
Mumaw subdivided the property and sold a portion to Nurad, Inc. in 1976. Id. Nurad never
used any of the underground storage tanks. Id. In 1987 Nurad was ordered to remove the tanks
and cleanup the site, which it did at a cost of $226,000. Id. at 840-41.
17. Id. at 842. The court observed: "Nurad contends that as lessees the tenants had a prop-
erty interest that necessarily included the implicit authority to control the portion of the site that
contained the USTs." Id. at 843.
18. Id. at 842 (citations omitted).
19. Whether it be through contract, as in the case of an "operator," or through conveyance
of an interest in the property, as in the case of an "owner."
20. See Nurad, 966 F.2d at 843 ("The statute [CERCLA] places accountability in the hands
of those capable of abating further environmental harm, while Nurad's proposed definition ...
would rope in parties who were powerless to act.").
21. The court also held the tenants were not CERCLA "operators." Id. at 842.
22. Id. at 843.
[Vol. 31:731
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and scope of the tenants' rights.3 This indicates persons will be per-
mitted to engage in the private ordering of their affairs in an effort to
minimize environmental risk by minimizing their "authority to con-
trol."24 It also means that loose language in documents may provide a
basis for finding "authority to control" when it was not intended or
desired.25
Another approach to defining "owner" focuses on traditional
property classifications rather than focusing on the "authority to con-
trol" created by the property interest. For example, in Long Beach
Unified School District v. Dorothy B. Godwin California Living
Trust,26 the court considered whether ownership of a pipeline ease-
ment in contaminated land would make the easement holder an
"owner" or "operator" under CERCLA.27 The court followed a com-
mon law label approach noting: "The common law does not regard an
easement holder as the owner of the property burdened by it. Rather,
an easement is merely the right to use someone's land for a specified
purpose .... 2 8 It is hard to argue with the court's statement of basic
easement law, but it fails to provide a workable test for evaluating
whether a property interest warrants CERCLA liability.29 Arguably,
the Long Beach court's real motivation for exempting easements from
CERCLA "owner" status was its desire to mitigate the harsh and
often unfair impact that could otherwise result. The court supported
its holding stating:
23. Id. at 843-44.
24. Structuring, supra note 12, at 165-77 (discussing how Nurad principles can be used by
lessors and lessees to manage their environmental risks).
25. Comparison of the non-participating royalty interest and the non-participating mineral
interest demonstrates the importance of structuring to minimize environmental risk. From an
environmental risk perspective, if the primary goal is to create a right to passively participate in
mineral income, the royalty interest is superior to the mineral interest. It is much easier to argue
that a royalty interest owner has no "authority to control" what goes on at the mineral develop-
ment site. Id. at 164-65 (discussing benefits of nonparticipating interests).
26. 32 F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1994).
27. Id. at 1367-69.
28. Id. at 1368. The court sets up CERCLA for a mechanical property law classification
analysis noting: "[W]e read the statute [CERCLA's definition of "owner"] as incorporating the
common law definitions of its terms." Id.
29. The Long Beach case was followed by the court in Grand Trunk W. R.R. v. Acme Belt
Recoating, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1125 (W.D. Mich. 1994), which concerned the CERCLA "owner"
status of a person having an easement for ingress and egress across contaminated property. Like
the court in Long Beach, the court in Grand Trunk failed to engage in a qualitative evaluation of
the rights created in the easement holder to determine whether they rose to the level of CER-
CLA ownership. See iL at 1130-33. Accord Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 870 F. Supp.
1465, 1484 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (applying similar principles to a limited license to enter land to
dispose of solid waste).
1996]
5
Pierce: The Impact of Landowner/Lessor Environmental Risk on Oil and Gas
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1995
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Sound public policy supports this reading of the statute. Vast
numbers of easements encumber land title records throughout the
United States, establishing such diverse rights as the running of util-
ity poles, cables and railroad track, irrigation, overflight, passage on
foot, even use of a swimming pool-not to mention "scenic" ease-
ments .... Subjecting holders of these interests to CERCLA liabil-
ity would not only disserve the statute's purposes-which is to make
polluters pay for the damage they cause-but it would vastly and
unjustifiably increase the potential number of CERCLA
defendants.30
The problem with the Long Beach court's reasoning is that it could be
applied to the vast majority of persons otherwise encompassed by
CERCLA's broad liability net. By exempting wholesale one group of
not-so-culpable people, it will often cast the total financial burden of a
cleanup on other people who are equally not-so-culpable, but not for-
tunate enough to have taken an easement in the property instead of
some other property interest.
The court's analysis in Nurad would seem to more accurately al-
locate CERCLA liability than the approach in Long Beach. An "au-
thority to control" analysis can be used to define the scope of
"ownership" whether the interest is labeled an easement, lease, real
covenant, equitable servitude, license, or any other interest that is less
than a fee simple absolute. Although a court may arrive at the same
conclusion of non-ownership applying the Nurad test, it provides a
workable analytical construct for distinguishing between CERCLA
owners and non-owners regardless of how a party's legal rights in the
contaminated land are characterized.
For example, in the oil and gas context it would be unfair to class-
ify all owners of a "mineral interest" as being either owners or non-
owners for CERCLA purposes. Depending upon the nature of the
rights granted or retained in the mineral interest, the "mineral inter-
est" owner may have extensive rights to enter and use the property,
very limited rights, or no rights whatsoever. 31 The specific conveyance
30. Long Beach, 32 F.3d at 1369 (citations omitted).
31. The best example is the non-executive mineral interest where all development rights
have been severed from the right to passively receive income from the interest. The grantee of
the interest has no right to enter the property, conduct development operations, or authorize
others to develop the property. These development, "authority to control," rights are all held by
the grantor-who also owns a "mineral interest." See generally Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117
(Tex. 1986) (discussing attributes of a mineral interest). Depending upon how the rights of each
party are characterized, they could be readily distinguished applying a Nurad "authority to con-
trol" analysis to determine CERCLA "ownership." However, the analysis becomes more in-
volved if the executive rights holder is found to have a fiduciary obligation to seek development
of the interest on behalf of the non-executive rights holder. See generally Manges v. Guerra, 673
[Vol. 31:731
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must be reviewed to ascertain the actual scope of the rights granted.
Once these rights are identified, they can be evaluated to determine
what sort of "authority to control" they confer on their owner. A sim-
ilar analysis can be applied to any other interest created in property-
including easements. In the typical oil and gas transaction, there will
be a myriad of property interests-interests that have defied easy
"common law" classification.32
B. The Implied Easement of "Reasonable Use"
One of the most common mineral transactions resulting in multi-
ple ownership of a property interest is the severance of a mineral es-
tate from the surface estate.33 Although each party will have a degree
of exclusive ownership in their respective estates, they will also have
certain non-exclusive rights in the other party's estate. Absent limit-
ing language in the conveyance creating the property interests, the
surface owner will have the right to continue using the surface that
overlies the mineral estate.34 The mineral owner will have the right to
make "reasonable use" of the surface estate to the extent necessary to
S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. 1984) (executive rights holder has fiduciary obligation "to acquire for the
non-executive every benefit that he exacts for himself"). Since the Manges case, courts have
attempted to limit the scope of the fiduciary obligation created by the court in Manges. E.g.,
Mims v. Beall, 810 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ("In Manges, the court held that the
fiduciary duty is owed only in the area of the executive interest owner's duty to obtain appropri-
ate benefits for the non-participating royalty holders."); Pickens v. Hope, 764 S.W.2d 256 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988) (finding no fiduciary duty to holder of a specific fractional non-participating
royalty). See David E. Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: Relationships,
Contracts, Torts, and the Basics, 41 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx'N 1-1, 1-6 to 1-19 (1990).
However, to the extent the non-executive rights holder is held to have an enforceable right to
force the holder of the executive rights to develop the property, the non-executive may have
"authority to control." The executive could also be viewed as the "agent" of the non-executive
for purposes of exercising the "authority to control." Most states have not addressed the nature
of the executive/non-executive relationship; when they do it is unlikely they will apply the fiduci-
ary approach used by the Texas courts. See generally Ernest E. Smith, Implications of a Fiduci-
ary Standard of Conduct for the Holder of the Executive Right, 64 TEx. L. REv. 371 (1985).
32. JOHN S. Loxw, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NutsHELL 36-48 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing the
various kinds of oil and gas interests and their unique characteristics); 1 DAVID E. PIERCE,
KANSAS OIL AND GAS HANDBOOK § 4.10, at 4-13 (1986) ("In many instances the legal conse-
quences of a transaction are determined according to how a particular oil and gas interest is
classified.").
33. Although the oil and gas lease in jurisdictions like Texas would also be viewed as a
conveyance of a fee simple determinable, Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 254
S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923) (oil and gas lease creates a fee simple determinable in the oil and gas), the
unique relationship created by the oil and gas lease will be discussed under the "contract" sec-
tion of this article.
34. 1 EUGENE KuNrz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.2(d), at 91-92 (1987).
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efficiently develop the mineral estate.3 5 The fee owner's prior exclu-
sive right to use the surface will be limited by the mineral owner's
right to use it to access the severed mineral estate.36
The end result is that two parties now have the right to use the
surface of the land for different purposes. This is a classic formula for
magnifying the environmental risk of both parties. As noted previ-
ously, when one party shares the right to use and occupy land with
others, each party's environmental risks can be impacted by the ac-
tions of others on the land.
For example, in Quaker State Corp. v. U.S. Coast Guard,37 the
surface owner was held to be an "owner" under the Clean Water Act
(CWA) and, therefore, responsible for cleanup of an oil containment
pit.38 The court had to determine who was the "owner or operator" of
the pit area applying CWA Section 311.39 Use of the pit ceased in
1968;40 Quaker State's lease expired in 1975.41 In 1977, at the direc-
tion of the surface owner,42 Quaker State "covered the pit by bulldoz-
ing earth over it, compacting and seeding it."'43  Quaker State
subsequently abandoned its operations on the leased land in 1978. 44
In 1985, representatives of the Coast Guard and the Environmental
Protection Agency observed an off sheen on the surface of a creek
near the oil containment pit.45 The Coast Guard spent $430,000 to
clean up the pit and abate the release.46 The court held the owner of
the surface, at the time the discharge was discovered, was the "owner or
operator" liable for cleanup costs under CWA Section 311(f). 47
35. 1 HowARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 218.7-.8 (1995).
36. See generally David E. Pierce, Incorporating a Century of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence
into the "Modern" Oil and Gas Lease, 33 WAsHBuRN L.J. 786, 794-95 (1994).
37. 681 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
38. Id. at 286.
39. Clean Water Act (CWA) § 311,33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994). CERCLA's liability provisions
are patterned off of § 311. Liability.Forcing, supra note 1, at 407-08. Section 311 imposes liabil-
ity on the "owner or operator" of a facility for cleanup of a discharge of oil or hazardous sub-
stances into waters of the United States. CWA § 311(t), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0 (1994).
40. The court noted that "there is no evidence here that Quaker State ever used this pit."
Quaker State, 681 F. Supp. at 283.
41. Id.
42. At all relevant times the surface of this property was owned by the U.S. Forest Service.
Id. at 284.
43. Id. at 283.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 282.
46. Id. at 281.
47. Id. at 285. The court justified its holding stating:
If the Government must bear the cost of cleanup, there must be a ready pocket for
reimbursement. It is the owner or operator at the time the spill is first discovered who
has control of the site and the source of discharge. He is readily identifiable. He is
[Vol. 31:731
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Therefore, the surface owner of the land where the pit was located
was the "owner" of the pit under CWA Section 311.48
The Quaker State case highlights the new context in which the
concept of "reasonable use" must be viewed. If the mineral owner or
lessee is given the right to make "reasonable use" of the surface, must
the "reasonableness" be evaluated in light of new environmental lia-
bilities, or liability risks, the surface owner might suffer? For example,
it is permissible under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)49 to dispose of certain exploration and production wastes at
the lease site since, for purposes of RCRA, they are not classified as
hazardous wastes.50 However, the presence of these "exempt" RCRA
wastes could pose a risk under CERCLA51 because waste exempt
most likely to be in position to halt the discharge, to effect an immediate cleanup, or to
prevent a discharge in the first place. If the onus of cleanup falls on the Government,
he is the clearest and most expeditious source for reimbursement.
Id. See also White v. Regan, 575 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376-77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding current
owner of land liable for petroleum discharge under New York statute and government need not
seek out other parties who caused or contributed to the discharge). Note that the court in
Quaker State applied an "authority to control" type of analysis to define the current "owner" for
purposes of the Clean Water Act. Quaker State, 681 F. Supp. at 285.
48. See generally Kenneth H. Blakley, Environmental Law: Regulation of Pits in Oklahoma
and Associated Liability, THE LANDmAN, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 55,59 (discussing § 311 of the Clean
Water Act and Quaker State).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939b (1994) (RCRA comprises Subchapter III-Hazardous Waste
Management of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994)).
50. This is commonly known as the RCRA "associated waste exemption." Section
3001(b)(2)(A) of RCRA provides:
[D]rilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration,
development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or geothermal energy shall be
subject only to existing State or Federal regulatory programs in lieu of this subchapter
[until the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) completes a study on whether
such wastes should be regulated as hazardous wastes].
RCRA § 3001(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (1994). The EPA completed its study and in
July 1988 announced its decision to exempt several exploration, development, and production
wastes from regulation as a "hazardous" waste. Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and
Geothermal Exploration, Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446 (1988). The
mining industry enjoys a similar exemption created by RCRA § 3001(b)(3)(ii), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6921(b)(3)(A)(ii) (1994) (exempting "[s]olid waste from the extraction, beneficiation, and
processing of ores and minerals").
The exemptions are found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b) (1994) which provides, in part:
The following solid wastes are not hazardous wastes:
(3) Mining overburden returned to the mine site.
(5) Drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the explora-
tion, development, or production of crude oil, natural gas or geothermal energy.
(7) Solid waste from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing of ores and min-
erals (including coal, phosphate rock and overburden from the mining of uranium ore)
51. See CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). Also, even though the waste
is exempt from "hazardous" waste management under RCRA, it can still be the subject of a
9
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under RCRA can be considered hazardous substances under
CERCLA.5 2
A "release" or "threat of a release" that warrants the expenditure
of cleanup costs can give rise to liability for not only the party that
disposed of the waste (the lessee and their drilling contractor), but
also the party who owned the land at the time it was placed there (the
surface owner). 3 Since the deed or lease most likely fails to address
these inatters,54 the issue will be resolved through judicial interpreta-
tions of "reasonable use." What was reasonable before CERCLA,
and CERCLA-type statutes, may not be reasonable today. To the ex-
tent that the mineral interest owner's or lessee's conduct could appre-
ciably increase the surface interest owner's environmental risks, it
may be outside the scope of "reasonable use" and thus not permissible
under the deed or lease creating the right. Therefore, each develop-
ment activity must be evaluated to identify the environmental risk and
determine whether there are reasonable alternatives that pose less
risk to the surface owner.
To date, one reported case highlights a landowner's potential in-
creased environmental risk as a basis for limiting oil and gas operator
cleanup activities on leased land. In Gray v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,5
landowners sued various oil and gas companies asserting their land
had been contaminated with naturally occurring radioactive material
(NORM) generated by the companies.5 6 The landowners' lawsuit in-
cluded claims for negligence, nuisance, strict liability, trespass, assault
and battery, and breach of contract, all arising out of the presence of
NORM on their property.57 The oil companies attempted to enter the
cleanup order under the "imminent hazard" provisions of RCRA. See RCRA § 7002(1)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994) (citizen suit "imminent hazard" authority); RCRA § 7003(a), 42
U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1994) (EPA "imminent hazard" authority). See supra note 8 (quoting relevant
language from RCRA §§ 7002-7003).
52. To date, courts have been unwilling to try and harmonize exemptions under RCRA with
CERCLA, or exclusions under CERCLA with RCRA. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,
958 F.2d 1192, 1202 (2d Cir. 1992) (ruling RCRA's "household waste" exemption does not ex-
empt household waste from being classified as a hazardous substance under CERCLA).
53. CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1994). See also CERCLA § 107
(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994) (imposing cleanup liability on the "owner" of a site where
"there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance.").
54. Prospectively, mineral conveyances and oil and gas leases can and should address sur-
face use from an environmental risk perspective. See Structuring, supra note 12, at 155-62, 165-
77.
55. 874 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
56. Id. at 749.
57. Id. at 751.
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property to clean up the site.58 The landowners sought an injunction
to prevent the oil companies from entering their property and con-
ducting a cleanup "without first securing plaintiffs' approval of any
proposed method of disposing of the contaminated soil."59
Although not deciding the issue,60 the court's opinion sets out the
plaintiffs' contention that as landowners their objections to the pro-
posed cleanup were reasonable since under federal hazardous sub-
stance cleanup laws the landowners could be held liable for disposal of
the NORM removed from their property.61 The plaintiffs asserted
that NORM is a "hazardous substance" under CERCLA and that
there was really no way the oil companies could effectively indemnify
or hold the landowners harmless against subsequent CERCLA
claims.62 The plaintiffs' pleadings stated:
American can provide no assurance that it will remain solvent dur-
ing the entire period of potential liability under CERCLA or other
law-which because of the long half-lives of NORM radio-nuclides
is essentially infinite in duration. Clearly, Plaintiffs have an enor-
mous interest in insuring that the remediation that American has
offered to perform is done safely, properly and fully in accordance
with not only present law, but the law of the foreseeable future.63
The plaintiffs' assertions in the Gray case illustrate that a land-
owner may have a quantifiable right to be free of unnecessary envi-
ronmental risk created by others having a right to use the property. If
risk-generating substances are deposited on the landowner's property,
landowner liability can arise in two contexts: first, as an "owner" of
the property where the waste is located;64 and second, as a "genera-
tor" of the waste if it has to be removed from the land at a later date
58. Id. at 750. This is a valuable tactic that can be used to defend this type of case since it
often eliminates the nebulous claims for "time bomb" damages. If the area has been cleaned up
to levels accepted by the appropriate regulatory agencies, the plaintiff's damages will be substan-
tially reduced, or perhaps eliminated. Also, cleaning up the site takes much of the economic
incentive for the litigation away from the plaintiff, and their attorneys. For example, if the plain-
tiff recovered $500,000 in damages based on what it would take to clean up the site, in most cases
there will be no requirement that the plaintiff spend any of the money they receive for any sort
of cleanup. If the property is subsequently found to require a cleanup, the regulatory authorities
will most likely order the oil company, which has already paid money to the plaintiff, to conduct
the cleanup.
59. Id.
60. The court was merely considering whether it should remand the case back to state court
following removal to federal court. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(2) (1994) ("current" owner and
owner "at the time of disposal").
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and taken to another location.6 5 These risks can be avoided if either
non-risk-generating substances are used by the mineral developer or
the risk-generating substances are properly managed at the time they
are generated to ensure they do not become a waste liability for the
surface owner.66
As the potential for surface owner liability is realized, surface
owners will demand that mineral developers employ the most effec-
tive development techniques available to minimize the surface
owner's potential status liability. The minimum requirements will be
defined in terms of "reasonable use." Developers that fail to employ
the minimum requirements practiced by the industry67 will be subject
to trespass claims by surface owners.68 However, even though the de-
veloper complies with the minimum requirements practiced by the in-
dustry, and, therefore, arguably within their "reasonable use" rights,
the vigilant surface owner may be able to demand more on a case-by-
case basis.
65. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1994) (disposal of hazardous substances
"owned or possessed by such person").
66. The mineral interest owner and lessee must also be concerned with what the surface
owner does on the surface. Since the mineral owner/lessee possesses an implied easement to use
the surface, Structuring, supra note 12, at 165, they will be concerned with surface owner actions
that may impair the ability, or desirability, of using the surface to extract granted minerals. For
example, if the surface owner brings drums of hazardous waste onto the surface, the mineral
interest owner, or their lessee, may be very reluctant, due to the environmental risk, to exercise
their surface use rights. The surface owner's actions would appear to be just as much an interfer-
ence with the mineral interest owner's easement rights as if they constructed a building over the
easement area. The mineral interest owner, or lessee, may now be able to limit the surface
owner's use of the surface when it could impair the value of the mineral owner's easement rights.
The mineral interest owner also has an argument that, as a concurrent "owner" of the property,
the surface owner's actions are improperly increasing the mineral owner's environmental risk-
even if the surface is never used to support mining activities. Id. at 154-55, 165.
67. The "minimum requirements" are a moving target. What is the acceptable "minimum"
today may not be acceptable tomorrow. Also, it is likely that in the environmental liability arena
courts may be more inclined to look at how the more innovative developers are addressing
problems, instead of looking to the "average" or predominant practice. Cf. id. at 177.
68. E.g., Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1961) (holding improper disposal of pro-
duced water damaged the lessor's land and groundwater). In Brown the court held:
The right of the lessee in exploring for and producing oil and gas embraces only
the doing of those things expressly granted or necessarily implied in the lease as neces-
sarily incidental thereto. All property rights not granted are reserved in the lessor. The
rights of the lessor and lessee are reciprocal and distinct. If either party exceeds those
rights he becomes a trespasser. Thus, if the lessee negligently and unnecessarily dam-
ages the lessor's land, either surface or subsurface, his liability to the lessor is no differ-
ent from what it would be under the same circumstances to an adjoining landowner.
Id. at 866 (citation omitted).
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C. The Accommodation Doctrine
Conceptually, the accommodation doctrine comes into play when
the mineral developer is engaging in "reasonable use" of the land, but
the surface owner believes, under the circumstances, more is required
of the developer to protect the surface owner's pre-existing land
uses.69 The doctrine was first clearly articulated in Getty Oil Co. v.
Jones7" where the court held that an oil and gas lessee could be re-
quired to lower the proffle of its pump jacks to accommodate the sur-
face owner's pre-existing center pivot irrigation system.7' More
recently, the Texas Supreme Court has characterized the doctrine as
being based on the concept of "due regard" for the rights of the sur-
face owner.72 This places the burden of proof on the surface owner to
demonstrate that the "use of the surface is not reasonably necessary
69. In Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979), the court described the
accommodation doctrine as follows:
In addition to, or underlying the question of what constitutes reasonable use of the
surface in the development of oil and gas rights, is the concept that the owner of the
mineral estate must have due regard for the rights of the surface owner and is required
to exercise that degree of care and use which is a just consideration for the rights of the
surface owner. Therefore, the mineral estate owner has no right to use more of, or do
more to, the surface estate than is reasonably necessary to explore, develop, and trans-
port the minerals. Nor does the mineral estate owner have the right to negligently or
wantonly use the surface owner's estate.
Id. at 135 (citations omitted). The court's statement of the doctrine in Hunt Oil seems to com-
bine the accommodation doctrine with the implied right to make "reasonable use" of the sur-
face. This approach would tend to reduce the scope of the mineral interest owner's "reasonable
use" rights. When the issue is accommodation, it is often difficult to discern whether the com-
plaint is unreasonable use or reasonable use with a failure to accommodate. The remedy for
unreasonable use would be in tort (trespass) while the remedy for a failure to accommodate
would sound more in contract.
70. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
71. Id. at 623. The court's rationale for the doctrine was stated as follows:
It is well settled that the oil and gas estate is the dominant estate in the sense that
use of as much of the premises as is reasonably necessary to produce and remove the
minerals is held to be impliedly authorized by the lease; but that the rights implied in
favor of the mineral estate are to be exercised with due regard for the rights of the owner
of the servient estate.... The due regard concept defines more fully what is to be
considered in the determination of whether a surface use by the lessee is reasonably
necessary. There may be only one manner of use of the surface whereby the minerals
can be produced. The lessee has the right to pursue this use, regardless of surface
damage.... But under the circumstances indicated here; i.e., where there is an existing
use by the surface owner which would otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where
under the established practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the
lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of reasonable usage of the
surface may require the adoption of an alternative by the lessee.
Id. at 621-22 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
72. Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement Dist. Number One v. Haupt, Inc., 854
S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. 1993) (citation omitted).
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because of non-interfering and reasonable ways and means of produc-
ing the mineral that are available, the use of which will permit the
surface owner to continue the existing use of the surface." 73
The accommodation doctrine could be applied in the environ-
mental context. Depending upon how the "existing use" requirement
is applied, surface owners should be able to establish that the on-site
disposal or escape of any hazardous substance, or other environmen-
tally questionable substance,74 will impair the existing use of the sur-
face estate. If the surface owner can demonstrate the availability of
reasonable alternatives to the activity creating the environmental risk,
an obligation to accommodate can arise.75
III. THE CONTRACT DIMENSION
Lessee rights and obligations will arise out of the express terms of
the oil and gas lease, implied "property" rights and limitations under
"reasonable use" principles, plus "contractual" rights and limitations
under implied lease covenants.
A. Express Oil and Gas Lease Terms
Where the mineral estate was severed from the surface estate
prior to being leased, the oil and gas lessee's surface use rights will be
limited by "reasonable use" property law principles.76 Although the
subsequent oil and gas lease may limit the lessee's rights with regard
73. Id. The court restated the Getty test as follows:
Getty recognizes that if there is but one means of surface use by which to produce
the minerals, then the mineral owner has the right to pursue that use, regardless of
surface damage. On the other hand, if the mineral owner has reasonable alternative
uses of the surface, one of which permits the surface owner to continue to use the
surface in the manner intended (especially when there is only one reasonable manner
in which the surface may be used) and one of which would preclude that use by the
surface owner, the mineral owner must use the alternative that allows continued use of
the surface by the surface owner.
Id. at 911-12 (citation omitted).
74. This could include something that is not currently classified as a hazardous substance
but which may present risks to the environment if not properly managed. If something is classi-
fied as a CERCLA hazardous substance tomorrow, it will be subject to retroactive cleanup, and
cleanup liability. See United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497,1506 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990) (holding CERCLA, including pre-judgment interest provisions in
1986 amendments, is to be given retroactive effect); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
cal & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (holding
Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactively).
75. Obviously it would be better for the surface owner to avoid having to engage in this
analysis altogether by including express language in the mineral conveyance or oil and gas lease
addressing such surface use issues. See Structuring, supra note 12, at 151-62, 173-77 (discussing
and applying specific drafting suggestions).
76. See 4 Ku'rrz, supra note 34, § 50.4(a), at 298.
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to their mineral interest lessor, the lease cannot expand upon the prior
surface use limitations created by the conveyance severing the miner-
als from the surface. 7 However, in situations where the oil and gas
lease is entered into prior to severance of the surface from the miner-
als, the terms of the oil and gas lease can define the respective rights
of the parties.78 To the extent the lease document fails to address the
issue, the void may be filled either by a "reasonable use" property
analysis or an implied covenant contract analysis.79
Most oil and gas lease forms used by lessees contain broad ex-
press grants of rights in the leased land without addressing specific
surface use issues. For example, one form commonly encountered
provides:
1. Lessor ... hereby grants, leases and lets exclusively unto
lessee for the purpose of investigating, exploring, prospecting, drill-
ing, mining and operating for and producing oil, liquid hydrocar-
bons, all gases, and their respective constituent products, injecting
gas, water, other fluids, and air into subsurface strata, laying pipe
lines, storing oil, building tanks, power stations, telephone lines, and
other structures and things thereon to produce, save, take care of,
treat, manufacture, process, store and transport said oil, liquid hy-
drocarbons, gases and their respective constituent products and
other products manufactured therefrom, and housing and otherwise
caring for its employees, the following described land ....
7. Lessee shall have free use of oil, gas, and water from said
land, except water from lessor's wells and tanks, for all operations
hereunder, including repressuring, pressure maintenance, cycling,
and secondary recovery operations .... Lessee shall have the right
at any time during or after the expiration of this lease to remove all
property and fixtures placed by lessee on said land, including the
right to draw and remove all casing. When required by lessor,
lessee will bury all pipe lines below ordinary plow depth. Lessee
shall pay for damages caused by its operations to growing crops on
said land. No well shall be drilled within two hundred feet (200 ft.)
of anw residence or barn now on said land without lessor's consent
Paragraph one of the lease form identifies the activities that can be
pursued on the land but does not address "how" the authorized activi-
ties will be pursued. Paragraph seven gives the lessee broad rights to
77. See 4 id.
78. See 5 id. § 55.1, at 17.
79. See 5 id. § 55.2, at 19.
80. Oil and Gas Lease Form 88--(Producers), Kan., Okla. & Colo. 1962 Rev. Bw, Kansas
Blue Print Co. Inc. [hereinafter Form 88].
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use water from the leased land, imposes limits on burying pipelines
and placing wells near existing buildings, and requires payment for
damages caused to growing crops. However, the details of develop-
ment technique and surface use are not addressed.
Since the oil and gas lease is usually silent regarding development
technique and surface use, a "reasonable use" analysis will be em-
ployed by courts to define the scope of the lessee's surface use
rights.8 ' The analysis will be the same as used to define surface rights
and obligations following the severance of a mineral estate from the
surface estate. However, there will typically be more express lan-
guage to consider in the lease context than when dealing with a min-
eral deed. For example, an express right to build "structures... to...
treat, manufacture, [and] process" '82 oil and gas makes it clear the
lessee can use the surface for such purposes. The unanswered ques-
tion is whether the way the lessee proposes to exercise its right will be
acceptable under the circumstances. "Reasonable use" and accommo-
dation concepts will be used to address these issues.8 3 However, even
if the lessee's proposed course of conduct passes the "reasonable use"/
accommodation property tests, in the oil and gas lease context it must
also pass contractual implied covenant tests.
B. Implied Covenants
Since 1905, the industry has been told that the lessee, absent ex-
press provisions otherwise in the oil and gas lease, must do
"[w]hatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of
operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of both
lessor and lessee."' This passage created the "prudent operator"
standard to govern lessee activity when guidance is not found in the
express terms of the oil and gas lease.85 If the lease doesn't specify
what the lessee must do in a particular situation, the lessee must act as
a "prudent operator," which includes not only technical competence,
but also an awareness of the dual lessor/lessee interests it must pro-
mote.86 As Professor Lowe has noted: "Implied covenants in oil and
81. E.g., Mai v. Youtsey, 646 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1982) (finding lessee surface use rights
implied to "effectuate the grant" by providing lessee with the rights necessary to enjoy the prop-
erty interest it has been granted).
82. Form 88, supra note 80, 1.
83. See discussion infra Parts II.B.-C.
84. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).
85. See RicHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THm LAw OF OIL AND GAS 479 (3d ed. 1991).
86. See LowE, supra note 32, at 300-02.
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gas leases are unwritten promises that generally impose burdens on
lessees and protect lessors."'
The "prudent operator" standard has been used to ensure that
the lessee's operations keep pace with technological development s8 as
well as changes in the law. 9 The "prudent operator" concept, in the
environmental context, implicates both the technical and legal
realms.90 For example, if the lessee can conduct its drilling and re-
working operations without the use of earthen pits, does it have a
"contractual" obligation to do so, even though it will increase the
lessee's costs? What about the use of non-toxic drilling mud and other
drilling and production chemical products? What about recycling
drilling mud from site to site to reduce the waste ultimately
generated?
To the extent that the lessor can demonstrate a cognizable in-
crease in environmental risk associated with the activity, and reason-
able alternatives,91 the "prudent operator" may be required to change
its operating practices to accommodate the lessor's environmental
concerns-as a matter of contract law as opposed to property law.9
87. Id. at 296.
88. See HEMrNGWVAY, supra note 85, at 479-81.
89. Cf. Jacqueline L. Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy
Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1473, 1559 (1981). The previous sections demonstrate how
federal environmental law has potentially expanded the prudent operator's obligations to their
lessor. However, note that the source of these expanded obligations is new lessor "liability"--
not specific statutory commands to the lessee. If a statute requires lessees to reclaim a produc-
tion site, the statutory obligation typically becomes a measure of "prudent operation." How-
ever, when the statute does not command the lessee to do anything, it is much more difficult to
use the statutory obligation to define prudent operation. This is particularly the case when the
lessee is permitted by statutory law to engage in the activity in question-such as disposing of
"exempt" RCRA oil and gas production wastes at the lease site. See supra text accompanying
notes 49-52. The new breed of "liability-forcing" environmental statutes do not rely upon ex-
press command-and-control techniques to achieve environmental goals. Instead, they impose
cleanup liability on a broad range of statutorily defined parties; such as present and former
property owners and operators. Liability-Forcing, supra note 1, at 382-84. Therefore, "prudent
operation" in this new statutory context will arguably include an evaluation of lessee activities
that may unnecessarily increase the lessor's environmental liabilities. See id. at 422.
90. See e.g., Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 373 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
the lessee had breached the "implied covenant to operate prudently" arising out of "improper
maintenance and discharge of water, damage to the surface, and a poorly conducted water-flood
operation"); Shaw v. Henry, 531 P.2d 128, 132 (Kan. 1975) (finding the lessee breached the
implied covenant of "efficient management and operation" when it improperly disposed of pro-
duced water into storage ponds).
91. Even though the alternatives may be more expensive.
92. This would distinguish the relationship between the oil and gas lessee and its lessor/
surface owner from the surface owner and mineral owner relationship. The latter relationship is
based solely upon property law concepts while the former is based upon property law and con-
tract law. The lessor/lessee relationship gives rise to another layer of analysis that may further
limit the lessee's conceded property law rights.
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Building on a prior example, recall that although the lessee may be
permitted under state and federal law to dispose of certain drilling
fluids by burying them at the lease drill site,93 such a practice may not
be "prudent operation" since it can expose the lessor to potential en-
vironmental liabilities in the future.94 Although the public's interests,
in the short run, are served by complying with the law, and the lessee's
interests are served by an economical disposal option, the decision
negatively impacts the lessor's interest. This implicates the "prudent
operator" balancing act dictated by the Brewster case: "having regard
to the interests of both lessor and lessee." 95 What was previously ac-
ceptable may no longer be permissible because of the negative impact
it can have on the lessor.96
Therefore, when the landowner enters into an oil and gas lease,
they have three levels of analysis to explore in evaluating the propri-
ety of the lessee's specific surface use decisions. First, does the activ-
ity fall within the scope of "reasonable use?"'97 Second, even if the
activity constitutes "reasonable use," does the lessee have an obliga-
tion to accommodate the lessor's pre-existing uses of the property?
Third, if the activity passes the "reasonable use" and accommodation
analyses, is it the sort of activity a "prudent operator" would under-
take while promoting the mutual interests of the lessee and the lessor?
A possible fourth level of analysis concerns rights the parties may
have as a matter of statutory law.
IV. THE STATUTORY DIMENSION
In Oklahoma, pooling laws have authorized development opera-
tions on lands that are not under lease.98 For example, in Texas Oil
and Gas Corp. v. Rein,99 the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, in
order to create a 640-acre pooled unit, force pooled a 160-acre tract
93. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
95. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).
96. See James M. Colosky, The Implied Covenant for Diligent and Prudent Operations in an
Environmental Era, 39 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1, 15-4, 15-25 to 15-28 (1993). Colosky has
identified the implied covenant for diligent and prudent operations as the source of lessee im-
plied contractual obligations in the environmental context. Id.
97. This presumes the express terms of the oil and gas lease do not clarify the issue.
98. A similar situation could occur under Louisiana's forced pooling law. Nunez v. Vai-
noco Oil & Gas Co., 606 So. 2d 1320,1326 (La. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 608 So. 2d 1010 (La.
1992) "The Commissioner of Conservation is authorized to designate a drilling site 'at the opti-
mum position in the drilling unit for the most efficient and economic drainage of such unit."' Id.
at 1326 (quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:9(c) (West 1989)).
99. 534 P.2d 1277 (Okla. 1974).
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owned by Rein with 480 acres under lease to Texas Oil and Gas
Corp.1"' Rein owned the surface and minerals in the 160-acre tract
and refused to lease it for development.' The court held that the
Oklahoma pooling statute "authorizes the Commission to establish
the well location at any location upon the spacing unit"-even though
the unleased mineral and surface owner objects to having a well on
their property. 0 In a subsequent case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
observed: "Appellant, the owner of an unsevered mineral interest,
was forced by the Corporation Commission to participate in the unit
operation. He was forced to accept the intrusion on his land occa-
sioned by the order directing the well to be drilled there." 0 3
Although the court held the unsevered mineral interest owner should
be compensated for locating the well on its property,' °4 the court reaf-
firmed that "a forced-pooled surface and mineral owner is required by
the State to accept surface damage to his property.' 0 5
The force-pooled landowner can suffer increased environmental
risk as a result of unit development that takes place on their land; the
status-based environmental statutes do not exempt forced pooling."0 6
The targeted surface and mineral owner apparently has two options it
might pursue. First, the landowner could, in effect, seek to sell its sur-
face interest to the developer. Second, if the landowner wished to
retain ownership of the surface, they could seek provisions in the
pooling order to limit or leverage some of the environmental risks.
Oklahoma Statute Title 52, Section 87.1(e) provides, in part:
Where... such owners have not agreed to pool their interests and
where one such separate owner has drilled or proposes to drill a
100. Id. at 1278.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1279. In a companion case the Oklahoma Supreme Court summarized its holding
in Rein as follows:
The essence [of Rein's] contentions is that the effect of the order in this case, and
the order in the companion case concerning the well location, is to grant applicant the
right to drill upon Rein's property even though he has never contracted or consented to
allow anyone to drill thereon.
We have considered this argument in the companion case... and need not discuss
it further herein.
Id. at 1281.
103. Cormack v. Wil-Mc Corp., 661 P.2d 525, 526 (Okla. 1983).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Although the surface owner may ultimately be able to successfully assert a third-party
defense under CERCLA § 107(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1994), they would initially be
brought into the CERCLA liability net and have to expend considerable time, effort, and money
(attorney fees), in an effort to establish their defense.
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well on said unit.., the Commission ... shall, upon a proper appli-
cation therefor and a hearing thereon, require such owners to pool
and develop their lands in the spacing unit as a unit.... All orders
requiring such pooling shall be made after notice and hearing, and
shall be upon such terms and conditions as are just and reasonable
and will afford to the owner of such tract in the unit the opportunity
to recover or receive without unnecessary expense his just and fair
share of the oil and gas.10 7
Owners of the tract where the well is to be located could argue that
the Commission's order should require the drilling parties, at a mini-
mum, to indemnify them against environmental liabilities associated
with development. The pooling order could also limit development
practices, such as the use of pits, which increase the property owner's
environmental liability. Potential CERCLA liability alone would
seem to make such "terms and conditions" in a pooling order "just
and reasonable."' 08
V. CONCLUSION
The very foundation of oil and gas development is built upon the
ownership and control of oil and gas properties by more than one
party. Mineral interests are severed from surface interests, minerals
are leased, developers enter into assignments, farmouts, joint operat-
ing agreements, pooling orders are issued, and interests are placed
into fieldwide units for enhanced recovery operations.'0 9 It seems as
though at every turn a new property interest is being created in the
minerals and the surface estate that will be used to access the miner-
als. American property law has been an accommodating ally in the
107. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (1991 & Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
108. In McDaniel v. Moyer, 662 P.2d 309 (Okla. 1983), the district court ordered the opera-
tor of a pooled unit to post a $50,000 bond to secure payment of compensation for surface
damages and use of an abandoned and plugged well bore on the nonconsenting party's land. Id.
at 311. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the unit operator had the authority to locate the
unit well anywhere within the area designated by the Commission in its pooling order, including
the disputed surface area. Id. at 312-13. Although the court held it was improper to impose the
bond requirement, the court's holding does not rule out the use of a bond under appropriate
circumstances. Id. at 314 n.15. The court noted: "There had been as yet no invasion of the
landowners' asserted rights and no occasion shown for equitable intervention or relief." Id. at
314. The unit operator's right to use the existing well bore had not been determined so a bond-
ing requirement was premature. Id. at 313 n.13.
109. For a discussion of the potential environmental ramifications created by these transac-
tions, see Structuring, supra note 12, at 149-85.
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process. 110 Even the rule against perpetuities is becoming a less signif-
icant limitation on the attorney's imagination in creating new property
interests to achieve a client's goals. 1'
In the past, multiple ownership issues have focused upon uniting
the varied interests to facilitate development of the minerals. Today, a
major multiple ownership issue is evaluating how development of the
minerals can magnify the environmental risk of other interest "own-
ers." As courts acknowledge the environmental risk imposed upon
surface owners arising out of routine mineral development, the min-
eral developers' rights will be limited, and obligations expanded, to
protect the surface owner's rights.1 2 The flexible principles of "rea-
sonable use," accommodation, and "prudent operation" can each be
employed by courts to adjust the rights and obligations of the mineral
developer to eliminate the avoidable and unnecessary environmental
risks associated with mineral development.
110. E.g., Day & CO. v. Texland Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W2d 667 (Tex. 1990) (holding a sev-
ered executive right is a property interest instead of a right based in contract). In reversing the
limiting approach taken in Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Cain, 355 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1962),
overruled by Day, 786 S.W.2d 667, the court in Day held:
We erred in Cain when we compared the executive right to a power of appoint-
ment. Although the executive right is similar to a power, it is not a product of contract,
but rather a creature of property rights. Even when it is severed from the other rights
or attributes incident to the mineral estate, it remains an interest in property....
We hold that the executive right is an interest in property, an incident and part of
the mineral estate like the other attributes such as bonus, royalty and delay rentals.
Day, 786 S.W.2d at 669 (citations omitted).
111. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-3401 to 59-3408 (1994) (adopting the Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3404 (1994) excludes from the rule "[a]
nonvested property interest ... arising out of a nondonative transfer, except a nonvested prop-
erty interest... arising out of [listed marital, family, or estate transactions]."
112. The risk for the lessee is not that the lessor will be standing over its operations demand-
ing a particular course of action. The real risk is that lessors will raise the issue after-the-fact,
once they discover how wastes and other operations at the site-associated with past activities-
can impact them today. This puts the lessor in a position to demand that the materials be dug up
and taken off site, and the lessor's land "remediated." lypically, however, they will seek a lump
sum payment to compensate for the additional risks they are being forced to endure. The claim
will sound in contract and tort. Under a contract theory the lessor will assert their lessee failed
to live up to its implied contractual obligations under the oil and gas lease. Since this sort of
liability has existed since at least 1980, a large number of sites may be candidates for lessor
action. Under a tort theory the lessor will assert the lessee exceeded the scope of reasonable use
and has committed a trespass. The lessor will also have available the usual grab-bag of environ-
mental tort claims such as nuisance, negligence, and strict liability. See generally Marshall v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1989) (awarding landowner $400,050 actual and
$5,000,000 punitive damages arising out of environmental risk associated with well that had been
plugged and abandoned).
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